On ‘Organized Crime’ in the illicit antiquities trade: moving beyond the definitional debate by Dietzler, J.
On ‘Organized Crime’ in the illicit antiquities trade:
moving beyond the definitional debate
Jessica Dietzler
# The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The extent to which ‘organized crime’ is involved in illicit antiquities
trafficking is unknown and frequently debated. This paper explores the significance
and scale of the illicit antiquities trade as a unique transnational criminal phenomenon
that is often said to be perpetrated by and exhibit traits of so-called ‘organized crime.’
The definitional debate behind the term ‘organized crime’ is considered as a potential
problem impeding our understanding of its existence or extent in illicit antiquities
trafficking, and a basic progression-based model is then suggested as a new tool to
move beyond the definitional debate for future research that may help to elucidate the
actors, processes and criminal dynamics taking place within the illicit antiquities trade
from source to market. The paper concludes that researchers should focus not on the
question of whether organized criminals- particularly in a traditionally conceived,
mafia-type stereotypical sense- are involved in the illicit antiquities trade, but instead
on the structure and progression of antiquities trafficking itself that embody both
organized and criminal dynamics.
Keywords Organizedcrime .Transnationalcrime.Criminalmarkets . Illicit antiquities .
Antiquities trafficking . Routine activity theory
Introduction
The last several years of scholarship on the illicit antiquities trade have brought to
light a great deal of information about the actors, processes, and realities of the
transnational exploitation of illicitly acquired archaeological antiquities. The work of
researchers has helped to create a framework for analyzing the exploitation of illicitly
acquired archaeological antiquities and the criminal activities involved therein; how-
ever, significant gaps in our understanding of the trade, process, and actors remain.
Studying the criminal dynamics of the illicit antiquities trade is difficult due to a
Trends Organ Crim
DOI 10.1007/s12117-012-9182-0
J. Dietzler (*)
Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, University of Glasgow, College of Social and Political
Sciences, Ivy Lodge, 63 Gibson Street, Glasgow G12 8LR, UK
e-mail: j.dietzler.1@research.gla.ac.uk
paucity of available official data and the often filtered, sensationalized, non-specialist
media sources that are available; as a result, the extent to which ‘organized crime’ is
involved in the illicit antiquities trade is unclear (Mackenzie 2009:52), sometimes
debated, but more often assumed. However, the most reliable analyses suggest that
organized crime in the illicit antiquities market generally does not appear to be
stereotypical Mafia, but in the few cases that it is, it is the exception rather than the
rule (Proulx 2010; Nistri 2009:98). Scholars agree that there is a spectrum of
‘organized’ crime, but despite increasing sophistication in the treatment of the term
in the literature, the question of whether organized crime (as traditionally conceived)
is involved in the illicit antiquities trade still remains. There is limited evidence to
support that stereotypical mafia-type organized crime is involved (Mackenzie
2009:48); however, ‘organized crime’ as flexible, variable, opportunistic networks
does appear to be involved.
This paper begins with a consideration of looted antiquities generally and the
difficulties in estimating the international extent of the problem. Next, the paper
considers why ‘organized crime’ terminology matters in the context of looted
antiquities, why the terminology is problematic, and how media-perpetuated
stereotypes of organized crime have a distracting influence on understanding
the nature and extent of organized crime involvement in the trade. A new four-
stage progression model is then suggested as a fundamental platform from
which to build future research into the precise role of organized crime within
the illicit antiquities trade at local, national, and international levels.1 In light of
this model, the paper concludes that researchers should focus not on the
question of whether organized criminals- particularly in a traditionally con-
ceived, mafia-type stereotypical sense- are involved in the illicit antiquities
trade, but instead on the structure and progression of antiquities trafficking
itself that embody both organized and criminal dynamics.
Significance and scale of the problem
The scope and significance of the illicit antiquities trade is global, under-
reported, publicly misunderstood, and has become a crisis of epic proportions
with regard to the quality and quantity of our knowledge of human history
(Bowman 2008:228–230; Brodie and Renfrew 2005; Brodie and Tubb 2002;
Brodie 2011:409; Brodie et al. 2006; Gill and Chippendale 1993; Mackenzie
2009:52; Proulx 2010; Renfrew 2000). The illicit antiquities trade is a highly
sophisticated and lucrative business for profit/status-driven individuals, whether
collectors, professional dealers, or other middlemen. The trade is not lucrative,
however, for the locals or indigenous peoples in source countries ravaged by
conflict, political instability, or economic hardship (Bowman 2008:232; Brodie
2002; Hardy 2011:44; 203–204; Mackenzie 2009:52; Sandage 2009). In fact,
analysts such as Brodie (1998:1) have calculated that ‘looters’ (local people
comissioned by dealers or other middlemen) in source countries receive only
around 1 % of the overall profit that is made at the close of sale; Brodie found
1 The author will henceforth use the term ‘organized crime’ in its ambiguous form throughout this paper in
order to further underscore the definitional issues inherent within it.
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that over 98 % of profits went to ‘middlemen’ rather than to local diggers in
source countries. Source countries are understood to be the starting point of the illicit
antiquities trade process, the locations from where archaeological materials are illegally
and unsystematically excavated. They are countries known to be rich in archaeological
material, whose archaeological sites fall victim to the looting process (unsystematic
clandestine excavation) usually as a result of one or all of the following: weak and/or
corrupt political infrastructure, military conflict, unstable economic conditions, and lax
law enforcement policies and/or funding to curb the problem.
The problem of looted or stolen antiquities is most damaging in politically
conflicted and economically depressed regions (Brodie 2011:408–411; Dietzler
2007; Hardy 2011; Manacorda 2009) but is not isolated to conflict regions
alone; in fact, there are a number of politically and economically stable
countries that also experience theft of archaeological materials for profit; nota-
bly England, France, Italy, Germany, and Poland (Sandage 2009). Countries
easily fall victim to looting during times of political unrest; as a result of the
military conflict and political instability in Afghanistan, for example, there is
now a prolific trade in illegally acquired archaeological materials and other
antiquities — the exploitation and sale of which constitutes an economic
strategy for survival among local people (Schetter 2002:9–10) as well as being
reported as a mechanism of ‘terrorist funding’. In such source countries, looting
can occur at both publicly known and unknown archaeological sites (Proulx
2010:2). Bribery, falsification of legal documents and other pedigree paperwork
(ownership history, etc.), weak law enforcement and/or weak political infra-
structure, and other corrupt practices are also typical throughout the entirety of
the trafficking process from source to market end (Mackenzie 2009; Sandage
2009). In source, transit, and market countries, official corruption is often both
accommodating and frequent, especially when the items are not portable and
necessitate the use of heavy machinery (for digging and/or removal), forged
export documents, or freight shipping methods (Alder and Polk 2005:100–103;
Mackenzie 2009:50).2
Looting & ‘grey’ legitimacy
A high number of antiquities that end up on the market are suspected to have been
clandestinely removed from archaeological sites, hidden, and illegally transported
(smuggled) across international borders (Proulx 2010; Mackenzie 2005). Most
recently-surfaced antiquities on the market have either 1) no find-spot documentation
or ownership history, or 2) falsified or vague and unverifiable ownership history,
thereby disguising the illicit item under a cloak of licitness and allowing entry into the
open market (Alder and Polk 2005; Brodie 2002, 2009a, b, 2011:409). To further
complicate matters, the sale of licitly-obtained antiquities is legal (Alder and Polk
2002; Alder et al. 2009:126), giving the impression that the trade is altogether a
2 The author met with an individual who hails from a European country and works as a full-time freight
shipping specialist at a large European port. According to this source, shipping illicit antiquities from one
country’s port to another is “relatively easy,” as “freight shipping is the preferred method for these kinds of
[illicit antiquities] things, if this is what you are trying to do” (Personal communication, anonymous
European freight shipping specialist, 22 May, 2011).
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completely licit one. However, considering the illicit means by which most archae-
ological antiquities are sourced and end up on the market, the seemingly ‘licit’ nature
of the trade is confusing, if not deceptive. In fact, anyone who seriously considers the
archaeological antiquities market a legitimately and wholly licit one is either unin-
formed about the realities of the trade or they are willfully ignoring the realities of the
trade altogether; usually it is the latter (Brodie 2002; Mackenzie 2009).
The confusing mix of both licit and illicit items on the market in conjunction with
the constantly shifting legal status of those items from supply/source country to
demand/destination location are two of the main reasons why scholars refer to the
market as a ‘grey’ one (Polk 2000; Bowman 2008; Brodie 2011:409; Mackenzie
2009). Though the illicit antiquities trade shares many similarities with other trans-
national crimes, it is unlike some transnational crimes precisely because of its ‘grey’
nature (Polk 2000; Bowman 2008; Mackenzie 2009). Therefore, due to the illicit
means by which the majority of archaeological antiquities on the market are thought
to have been acquired, the constantly shifting legal status of the items, in addition to
the questionable or total lack of find-spot documentation and/or ownership history,
the readiness of the market to embrace illicit antiquities for sale is striking although
not entirely surprising considering the “culture of ignorance” (Mackenzie 2009:47)
embraced by most dealer communities.
Scale: official estimates
Despite the illegality of trafficking and selling illicitly acquired archaeological mate-
rials, the illicit antiquities trade remains a lucrative and thriving business. However,
assessing overall profitability and criminal dynamics of the trade is difficult due to
problems with official data (Proulx 2010:2),3 in addition to the difficulty in quanti-
fying numbers concerning black market goods by virtue of the illegal, secretive,
‘underground’ nature of trafficking activities. Illicit antiquities crimes often go under-
reported (if they are reported at all) and, though official data does exist, there is an
overall paucity of that data for several reasons (Proulx 2010:1–2). First, national US
criminal statistics regarding illicit antiquities crime are problematic because illicit
antiquities crimes are often lumped together with and labeled as ‘art crime,’ a
phenomenon that bears little resemblance to the acquisition, smuggling, and sale of
illicit archaeological materials (Proulx 2010:2).4 Secondly, national criminal statistics
regarding illicit antiquities may not be entirely representative of the trade because the
type of crime recorded is a category which tends to refer to the generic modus
operandi of the criminal act as opposed to the “type of object [that is] stolen”
(Proulx 2010:2). Moreover, in a 2011 paper, Brodie highlights the gravity of the
problem with illicit antiquities data in the statement: “There are no reliable statistics
describing either the material volume or monetary value of the trade” (p.411) (my
emphasis in italics).
Despite all of the problems with official data, there are some figures that do exist
and do promote the lucrative nature of illicit antiquities trafficking as an international
3 Official data i.e., military records, law enforcement reports, national criminal statistics, etc.
4 ‘Art crime’ generally refers to the theft of known, identifiable art works from established museums,
institutions, or private collections (Tijhuis 2006:129; Proulx 2010:2).
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multi-billion dollar industry (Proulx 2010), although researchers need to be wary of
uncritically accepting these estimates which, as with many other transnational criminal
markets, tend to be re-circulated to the point of becoming widely known without their
sources being robustly appraised. With that caveat in mind, we can note that as
commodities, illicit antiquities profits allegedly exceed those of other transnational
crimes such as narcotics and arms, in terms of value gained from source to market
(UNESCO 2011); and according to the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization, illicit antiquities are considered to be one of ‘the most persistent
illegal trades in the world’ alongside arms, narcotics, counterfeiting, and cybercrime
(UNESCO 2011:3). From source to market, the value of illicit antiquities is said to
increase as much as “100 fold, a greater growth than that of drugs” (UNESCO 2011:4),
possibly due to the fact that archaeological antiquities are a limited resource and “scarce
commodity” (Mackenzie 2009:50) and are usually purchased by wealthy high-status
individuals or institutions (Chappell and Polk 2009:6; Mackenzie 2009:51), while
narcotics and arms can be manufactured at will and purchased by a larger swath of the
population. Whatever wemake of what must be suspected to be over-hyped estimates of
the scale of the problem, or if any of these figures are based in fact, then clearly the
market for illicit antiquities is not “shrinking” as some dealers purport (Mackenzie
2009:53); rather, the illicit antiquities market continues to thrive, is highly profitable and
fed by illegally acquired archaeological materials which represent an international
commodity for which there is a strong existing demand.
Transnational crimes
The illicit antiquities trade is a dynamic transnational phenomenon (Alder and Polk
2005), at once both global and local— sometimes referred to as ‘glocal’ (Proulx 2010)
having grown in complexity and cultural significance over the last several decades.
Transnational crimes, in general, have become more complex due to the processes and
effects of globalization and the illicit antiquities trade is no exception to the rule
(Bowman 2008:225). Globalization brings change (social, political, technological, eco-
nomic, et al.) and international markets (both legal and illegal) react and adapt to those
changes. Themarket for illicit antiquities is not immune to the effects of globalization and
has— like other markets— had to adapt and react. The ease of international travel and
information sharing via the internet and other technological means havemade geographic
considerations somewhat of a non-issue, and criminals are able to exert their influence
over increasingly wider areas (Bowman 2008:225–226; Finckenauer 2005:79–80; Paoli
2002:51,69,70; Robinson 2000). In recent years, several scholars have suggested that the
trade in illicit antiquities closely resembles— and can be tied to— other illegal activities
such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms sales, money laundering, terrorism, and
‘organized crime’ (Bogdanos 2011; Bowman 2008:230–231; Brodie et al. 2000; Hardy
2011:204–209; Proulx 2010; Renfrew 2000).
Organized crime and mafia-colored perceptions
Over the last several years scholars in the ‘small field’ (Proulx 2010:1) of illicit
antiquities crime have attempted to ascertain the extent to which ‘organized crime’ is
involved in the illicit antiquities trade (Alder and Polk 2002, 2005; Chappell and Polk
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2011; Proulx 2010; Mackenzie 2005, 2009, 2011; Tijhuis 2006) but have been
challenged by certain factors, particularly the definition of ‘organized crime.’5 For
example, the field of criminology sees a significant difference between the terms and
concepts “Organized Crime” and “organized crime” (Hagan 2006:134). For Hagan,
“Organized Crime” refers to hierarchically organized groups, whereas “organized
crime” refers to criminal activities that exhibit some degree of organization (ibid.)
Understanding whether organized crime (of either type) is involved in illicit antiqui-
ties trafficking is important because, depending on which term is used and by whom,
it could significantly affect legislative decisions, policy design, and law enforcement
responses to the problem. In 2008, as a result of increased scholarly interest, the
United Nations (UN) hosted a three-day conference in Italy devoted entirely to the
topic: Organized Crime in Art and Antiquities.6 The consensus of the 2008 UN
conference was, in essence, threefold: first, that the involvement of organized crime
in illicit antiquities trafficking depends entirely upon what is meant by ‘organized
crime;’ second, that it does not appear to be organized in the stereotypical Mafia sense
of the term; finally, that there was not enough information at the time to determine the
precise role of organized crime in the trade.
The conference conclusions underscore the significant disagreement among schol-
ars as to whether ‘organized crime’ is involved in the trade at all. The disagreement is
likely a result of the confusion stemming from the definitional debate behind the
meaning of ‘organized crime’ as a concept and frequently misused term, exacerbated
by an overall paucity of official data available for study (Brodie 2009a, b:72–73;
Proulx 2010). For instance, with regard to the definitional debate on organized crime
in the illicit antiquities trade, Proulx (2010) studied the opinions of field archaeolo-
gists worldwide in order to elicit their personal experiences, regarding the involve-
ment of organized crime in the antiquities trade, and whether they personally
witnessed looting or organized criminals in action in the field. Proulx found that
archaeologists’ perceptions and opinions of organized crime were colored by notions
of American-Italian mafia, such as the ones represented and sensationalized in
popular media (blockbuster movies such as The Godfather and television programs
such as The Sopranos, news stories about La Cosa Nostra, et al.).
Proulx’s findings are consistent with what other criminologists have discussed
with regards to the apparent mafia-centered pollution of the ‘organized crime’
concept (Finckenauer 2005:63; Paoli 2002:52). In fact, one of the primary obstacles
to understanding the meaning of ‘organized crime,’ is the too-frequent use of the term
in reference to criminal activities of transnational scope and presumed association
with mafia-centered involvement (Paoli 2002:51). Finckenauer (2005:63) points out
that while the most common conception of ‘organized crime’ is synonymous with
mafia, ‘organized crime’ and mafia are two different things entirely (p.75). For
5 Proulx (2010:1;5–6) rightly points out that there is but only a small handful of scholars who specialize
(e.g., put forth significant criminological contributions) in researching the criminal aspects of the illicit
antiquities trade.
6 The International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC) hosted a conference titled Organized Crime in Art and
Antiquities in Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy (12–14 December 2008). The conference was attended by
145 experts from 27 different countries; the proceedings have been published and the information can be
found in the References section of this paper.
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Finckenauer (p.73), mafia is a socially constructed idea, a “cultural artifact,” that is but
one form of so-called ‘organized crime’ (p.74). Proulx’s findings demonstrate a signif-
icant problem that researchers studying organized criminal involvement in the illicit
antiquities trade face. That is, preconceived notions stemming frommedia influence can
significantly color data and, if used in vain, can be very dangerous. For Paoli (2002:55),
the term ‘organized crime’ is “ethnically loaded” and therefore dangerous as it conjures
up ideas and images of stereotypical mafia; this could be damaging to certain ethnic
communities in terms of their relation to their respective local social networks and
governments. Finckenauer (2005:77–78) echoes Paoli’s sentiment, noting the danger in
labeling crimes that are organized as ‘organized crime.’
Scholars disagree with each other as to the precise nature of ‘organized crime,’ but
are in agreement that there is instead a spectrum of what constitutes ‘organized,’ and
that there is not necessarily a single definition that encompasses all manifestations of
conduct that is both organized and criminal (Finckenauer 2005:68; Hagan 2006:127;
Orlova 2008:99; Paoli 2002:52,60; Von Lampe 2006).7 The term ‘organized crime’ is
problematic and the concept elusive (Edwards and Levi 2008:364), probably due to
the confusing inclusion of the word ‘organized’ (Finckenauer, p.64), and the domi-
nation of mafia stereotypes embedded in most people’s perception of the term.8 Ideas
and definitions of ‘organized crime’ vary widely (Finckenauer 2005:73; Hagan
2006:127)— possibly the reason why many textbooks do not even provide a working
definition (Hagan 2006:129–130). For Hagan (p.128), a universal working definition
does not yet exist, but there is a need for one as definitions affect law and policy-
making. While Hagan is correct that a definition is needed, ‘organized crime’
(whatever it is) does not fit well into a “tight legislated definition” because the
phenomenon itself is “amorphous” and “fluid,” thanks to the processes and effects
that globalization has on criminal activity (Orlova 2008:134). The term is at best
problematic and, at worst, downright harmful in that it could be “used to describe
almost any serious criminal occurrence” (ibid.) involving more than one individual. It
is for this reason that Orlova (2008:133) suggests taking into account the socio-
economic factors (unemployment, poverty, ethnic marginalization, et al.) that may
influence or even necessitate organized criminal activity on the part of some com-
munity members. This is an especially important point when considering looting
activity in source countries ravaged by war or political distress. Since most criminal
activities are shaped by local socio-economic and cultural contexts, national legisla-
tion should be specifically, albeit very carefully, tailored to fit local situations (p.134).
Given the potential implications of the ‘organized crime’ label, the responsibility
that weighs upon the organized crime researcher is heavy, as it is published material
that is cited and used by policy-makers when forming or enacting new legislation or
7 For more information on scholarly disagreement as to the precise nature of ‘organized crime,’ see, for
example: Abadinski 1994:6; Albini 1971:37;49; Finckenauer, 2005:81; Ianni 1975:14; Task Force Report:
Organized Crime, The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967);
United Nations, 2000:article 2; 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act: p.14, retrieved 21 April
2012 online at: http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OSEC/library/legislative_histories/1615.pdf
8 Paoli (2002:52) provides an insightful breakdown of how the concept of organized crime became as
conflated as it is today, discussing the American debate’s significant influence on the concept (with regards
to media sensationalism and mafia, etc.), how the concept was imported into Europe, and its current
influence on national and international policy–making and law enforcement responses.
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by law enforcement designing useful responses to the problem. Unfortunately, still,
news stories pour out of the media, books and articles are written, non-existent figures
are cited as ‘fact,’ and the proliferation of the polluted, stereotyped, ethnically-loaded
mafia-centered concept of ‘organized crime’ persists; the trade in illicitly-obtained
antiquities is no exception. In fact, popular media have been especially instrumental in
perpetuating this stereotypical mafia-type organized crime concept within the context of
antiquities. Manacorda and Chappell (2011) give an example of the questionable use of
the term ‘organized crime’ in the field of art crime where they observe one writer
presenting un-supporting ‘facts’ about the relationship between art crime, organized
crime, and terrorism without an apparent scientific basis to do so (see Manacorda and
Chappell 2011:3–5 referring to Charney 2009). Consider, however, how easy it is for
‘cited’ opinion to be taken at face value and, worse yet, even referenced as ‘cited’ fact in
subsequent scholarship, policy formation, and even courts of law. Herein lie the very
serious implications of the use of the term ‘organized crime.’
Moving beyond the conflated concept
We can shift our focus away from the definitional debate and instead toward understand-
ing more thoroughly the structure of the illicit antiquities trade as a transnational market
that is both organized and criminal by creating a framework of analysis based on Routine
Activity Theory (RAT) and supported byMarcus Felson’s (2006) ‘events, sequences, and
settings’ approach to understanding organised crime.9 RAT is a neo-classical and
spatially-oriented methodological approach for analysing criminal activities generally
and is useful for the purposes of understanding the structure of illicit antiquities trafficking
as a transnational phenomenon. RAT proposes that crime arises through the conjunction
of three fundamental components: 1— a suitable target; 2— a motivated offender; and
3 — the absence of capable guardianship. In the case of the illicit antiquities market, a
suitable target can be understood to be antiquities (e.g., the target desired — that is
suitable for a variety of reasons. (see Mackenzie 2009)); a motivated offender can be any
person whose choice to engage in criminal activity is based on rational decision-making
and is motivated enough to carry out the offense; the absence of capable guardianship is
the idea that at any stage in the process of trafficking an offense can be successfully carried
out by a motivated offender who has identified a suitable target in an environment that
lacks surveillance (bystanders, CCTVs, police, et al.) and makes a rational decision to act.
Building on RAT, Felson (2006) provides another useful approach to understand-
ing and dealing with organized crime, suggesting that a new “intellectual image of
criminal cooperation is needed” (p.8) in order to move beyond the definitional debate
and arrive at an appropriate understanding and response to the phenomenon.
According to Felson (2006:7), organized crime is dependent upon poorly managed
societies and necessitates recurrent local social settings where criminals can meet to
conduct business or recruit other criminals (p.10). Felson asserts that the organizing
principle of organized crime can be found in the ‘events, sequences, and settings’ of
criminal activity (p.8) and, if researchers look at the events, sequences, and settings
more closely, our intellectual understanding of organized crime can be greatly
enhanced (ibid.). Therefore, it is important to focus on events, the settings they occur
9 For more information about RAT, see for example: Clarke and Felson (1993); Felson (2002).
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within, and their sequences; in this way, the structure and continuity of criminal
activities, whether loosely or tightly organized, can be studied by looking at the
settings where offenders converge (p.10). Once identified, these ‘convergence set-
tings’ offer unique opportunities for understanding “the structure of criminal coop-
eration, even when [individual actor] participation is unstable” (Felson, p.9).
Offender participation is not stable because actors involved in criminal processes
are not necessarily static fixtures; relationships between contacts (at any point in the
process) sometimes break down due to arrests, lack of trust, et al. (p.13). It is for this
reason that Felson suggests focusing on the settings where actors converge, as
opposed to focusing on the actors themselves, if one wishes to understand the nature
of organized crime (p.10).
Four-stage sequence of progression
RAT, when combined with Felson’s (2006) ‘events, sequences, and settings’ ap-
proach to understanding organized crime, provides an intellectual framework that
can be used as an effective tool of analysis for the illicit antiquities trade as an
organised global phenomenon. By adopting this methodological approach and con-
sidering Mackenzie’s (2009, 2011) ‘market as both organized and criminal’ perspec-
tive, it may thus be helpful to construct a simple progressive framework from which
to build further research into the connections between illicit antiquities trafficking and
organized crime by focusing not on the actors themselves but instead on the progres-
sion of the trade and its basic sequences from source to market. The benefit of a
general progression-based model is that it provides a broad chartable view of the
entire process of illicit antiquities trafficking, while simultaneously allowing for
specific stages of the process to be studied as separate ‘ecosystems’ (Felson 2006)
in order to ascertain the extent of organization and criminal involvement. It thus
encourages scholarly focus to fall first and foremost on the concept of a market that is
both criminal and organized in its structure, functioning, and progression, and then on
the actors themselves who may or may not be ‘organized criminals’ in even a fluid,
elastic sense. The model allows actors to ‘fit’ into general sequences of the progres-
sion, whether or not those actors change or remain the same. Moreover, such a model
is useful for microscopic analysis of criminal connections and activities at different
stages throughout the trade. Overall the progression model, focused on the criminal
elements and organizational structure and sequence of antiquities trafficking, rather
than on the question of whether actors involved embody ‘organized crime’ which has
preoccupied much scholarship as discussed above, embraces a more interdisciplinary,
nuanced approach to understanding the organized criminal elements of the illicit
antiquities trade. The four-stage progression model in illicit antiquities trafficking can
thus be charted as follows in Table 1 below.
The four-stage progression model provides a fundamental framework for under-
standing the basic sequences of progression that occur within the illicit antiquities
market from source to demand end. Its importance is in this provision of a
framework, and the categories are filled in the model presented here for illustrative
purposes only rather than attempting an exhaustive exposition of the roles and
settings in the market, which is not the aim of this paper. As noted above, it also
shifts the research emphasis from consideration of individuals as both organized
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and criminal (‘organized criminals) to a focus on the structure and processes of
trafficking as both organized and criminal (‘organized crime’). The model is thus a
simple framework with at least three potential implications. First, the model helps
to articulate the processes, events, settings, and actors involved in each of the four
stages. Second, the data retrieved from analyzing each of the four stages sepa-
rately could elucidate the level and extent of organized criminal dynamics taking
place within each stage, filling in the knowledge gaps on how such cooperation
takes place from one stage to the next. Third, the data collected for each of the
four stages could help local, national, and international law enforcement design
more effective and locally-tailored responses to the problem respecting each
stage’s unique social considerations and environment. Clearly, the model allows
for more focus on the market itself as both organized and criminal, which is
independent of whether the individuals involved themselves could be considered
both organized and criminal (Proulx 2010; Mackenzie 2009). Situated within this
progression model, the types of illegal activities taking place within the illicit
antiquities trade can thus be considered ‘organized crime’ by virtue of their
complexity and the ingenuity demonstrated therein (Chappell and Polk 2009:2);
in fact, the illicit antiquities market is “…in itself an example of organized crime”
(Mackenzie 2009:41;59), by virtue of the organized structure of relationships
between actors and criminal activities (Paoli 2002:69). Therefore, if the market
is itself both criminal and organized, then the individuals participating in each
stage of the progression from source to market are also criminal and organized to
some degree (however loosely or tightly structured) (Paoli 2002:61;67–68).
Moreover, if ‘organized crime’ in the stereotypical mafia sense is involved in
illicit antiquities trafficking, it may not matter much in terms of the supply and
demand of the objects themselves (Mackenzie 2009); that is, organized crime
involvement is not going to change the demand for illicit antiquities in market
Table 1 Four-stage progression model
SEQUENCE Stage 1
Theft
Stage 2
Transit
Stage 3
Facilitation
Stage 4
Sale/Purchase
ROLE
Motivated Offender
Looters Smugglers Document Forgers
Government Officials
Curators
Academics
Launderers
Appraisers
Valuers
Dealers
Buyers
Collectors
MICRO-SETTING
Suitable Target & Absence of 
Capable Guardianship
Archaeological Site Border Checkpoint
Maritime Port
Airport Customs
University
Museum
Embassy
Border Checkpoint
Maritime port
Airport customs
Internet
Private residence
Museum
Hotel
Internet
MACRO-SETTING
Absence of Capable 
Guardianship
Source Country Transit Country Source Country
Transit Country
Market Country
Internet
Market Country
Internet
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countries, therefore — as with any other criminal market — the supply will be
driven as long as the demand persists (Paoli 2002:88).10
In light of the progression-based model described above, and provided that
antiquities trafficking is understood as a market that is in itself both organized and
criminal, the 2003 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UN 2004)
arguably offers some of the most significant enforcement tools to combat the traf-
ficking of illicit antiquities. The convention tried to standardize definitions of orga-
nized crime, criminalization of activities, and guidelines for international cooperation
and legal assistance. Illicit antiquities dealers could thus be understood, by virtue of
their association with other criminals trafficking illicit antiquities through the pro-
gressive pipeline, as complicit members of this organized criminal market, regardless
of whether they operate in a “culture of ignorance” or not. Dealers, by virtue of their
willingness to participate in the selling of illicit antiquities, take advantage of open
borders (through their willingness to cooperate and purchase items from actors who
are physically taking advantage of open borders), and the supply of their commodities
rely explicitly upon the weaknesses of political and economic infrastructure in source
countries. If the economic exploitation of looters and archaeological sites in source
countries can be understood as ‘injustice’ (UN Millennium Declaration 2000), then
dealers, by virtue of their complicitness and power in driving the market, can
therefore be understood to be unwitting oppressors helping to create that injustice,
regardless of their physical or cultural distance from looters or archaeological sites in
source countries.
Conclusion
The words we use to discuss social problems like looting, and the meanings and
ideologies we ascribe to those words (like ‘organized crime’), shape attitudes and
perceptions which drive policy and law. As Mackenzie (2005:1) argues, “before we
can talk of how best to regulate the market, we must be sure of the existence and
nature of the problem we wish to address.” For Chappell and Polk (2009:10),
thinking of illicit antiquities trafficking as ‘organized crime’ is important because it
emphasizes the complexity of the trade overall, as well as the challenges in designing
appropriate responses to the problem. Thinking about illicit antiquities within the
realm of organized crime changes how we frame the problem and respond to it, but
flexibility is necessary with what is meant by ‘organized crime.’ The exploitation of
local impoverished looters in source countries, in conjunction with the exploitation of
the world’s archaeological landscape for personal profit, is an affront to human
dignity and human history. In their search for tantalizing ancient artifacts, dealers
and collectors are now faced with an interesting dilemma; that is, in their quest to
admire and collect rare pieces of human history they are at the same time unwittingly
10 It is for this reason that Mackenzie (2009:55–58) suggests that future policy-making should focus on
implementing demand-reduction strategies; presently, however, effective public policy responses are
significantly lacking (Chappell and Polk 2009:7). In fact, regulatory controls are low across the entire
spectrum of the trade; archaeological site security is relatively non-existent and, more importantly, most
countries do not require antiquities dealers to be licensed (Mackenzie 2009:50–51).
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— and sometimes knowingly— destroying it through criminal and divisive means at
an unconscionable and alarming rate.
Though definitional problems and debate still surround the meaning of so-called
‘organized crime’ and its involvement in illicit antiquities trafficking, research
must move beyond the definitional debate, and must understand and accept that
the illicit antiquities market is both organized and criminal in order for new law
enforcement responses or policy-making to have any lasting effect on the trade.
Approaching and studying the illicit antiquities trade through an ‘events, sequen-
ces, and settings’ approach (as suggested in the four-stage progression model)
allows for the basic sequences of progression to be analyzed microscopically as
individual ecosystems and the links between them explicated in order for the
enhancement of our understanding of the internal, hidden dynamics of the trade
from source to market. The illicit antiquities trade is a transnational market
connecting supply and demand settings and events, via transit, trade and facilita-
tion mechanisms. Therefore, in order to stop the devastation of archaeological
landscapes, and to stop the economic exploitation of impoverished people in
struggling societies hard-hit by the ravages of conflict or political distress, future
legislation and policy-making should begin by considering the routine activities of
the market in terms of these analytical categories.
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